A distinction is often made between sociology in medicine and sociology of medicine and the same would seem to apply to the relationship between sociology and psychiatry.
Sociology in psychiatry
Sociology in psychiatry has its roots very firmly in the writings of Emile Durkheim. Perhaps it is fitting that Durkheim was a contemporary of Freud (though to my knowledge they were not aware of each other's work) because both grappled with similar problems from their respective psychological and sociological standpoints. Neither accepted the individual as a 'given', but were intent on exploring how the individual was created. But rather than using a biographical approach, Durkheim took an evolutionary and historical perspective'. Pre-industrial society, he argued, was characterized by a weak and poorly developed division oflabour, that is most people had similar tasks -farming, hunting or whatever -and were therefore interchangeable. This similarity of roles led to a poorly differentiated concept of self such that people could not see themselves as separate from the social totality, the tribe or the clan, to which they belonged. A sense of belonging, as in a traditional community, was therefore inimical to self-autonomy and personal identity.
With industrialization and increasing differentiation ofoccupations, people began to lead different everyday lives with a strong sense of this differentness. Thus, Durkheim argued, a cult of individuality emerged as a consequence of an increasing division of labour. There was, however, a transitional phase in which the old support of community was lost and the new sense of individuality had not properly developed. Durkheim called this stage 'anomie' or normlessness, a state in which people felt a loss of purpose and direction.
This framework of community, individuality and anomie formed the basis for Durkheim's third book, Suicide", which has since become a classic of social psychiatry. The typology of absent, developed and confused personal identity produced three different types of suicide: altruistic, in which suicide was committed for the sake of the group; egoistic, when the sense of individuality was excessive; and anomie, when the sense of purposelessness to life produced selfdestruction. Durkheim applied these models to contemporary suicide data to show, for example, how war or marriage increased the feeling of solidarity and decreased the modern epidemic of egoistic and anomie suicide.
For Durkheim, individual identity had a precarious existence between the community, which constantly threatened to envelop individual psychological life, and egoistic impulses, which tended to remove the person from the social to such an extent that their very existence as social beings was threatened. This schema can be compared with that of Marx who had a different concept of human nature". In an important sense identity was pregiven for Marx; it was socialization which -at least in its non-socialist forms -produced a sense of estrangement which Marx called alienation. Thus the two key sociological concepts of alienation and anomie are similar in their apparent psychological effect on people, but very different in their origins: alienation being produced, in effect, by too much (of the wrong) socialization; anomie, brought about by too little", Freud would seem to fit more in the Durkheimian camp than the Marxist, believing that individual identity was a product of socialization restraining the biological and mysterious 'id', Perhaps this helps to explain the dominance in psychiatry of models based on anomie rather than alienation. It is essentially the effect of social disintegration on the sense of identityand hence on psychiatric morbidity -which has provided the principal framework for social psychiatric studies from Leighton's post-war Sterling County studY; to the recent work of Brown and his colleagues in London", This is not to deny the contribution of the other sociological 'greats' to sociology in psychiatry. Studies oflife events and social support find these to be related to socioeconomic circumstances; and knowledge of the related distribution of psychiatric illness in the community has its origins in Marx's social class analysis. The importance of individual meanings in interpreting and intervening in the impact of social events on the individual psyche owes much to Max Weber's interpretive sociology which gave a central place to 'verstehen' in social life. Nevertheless, it is without doubt the landmark of Suicide2 which has guided and influenced so much of social psychiatry since, both in its concepts and its methods, and with it our understanding of both social and psychological life.
Sociology of psychiatry
Whereas sociology in psychiatry accepts the legitimacy and validity of what psychiatry is trying to do, the sociology of psychiatry wishes to examine and challenge precisely those assumptions. It is therefore inherently more critical, and has been accordingly less acceptable to many psychiatrists. Yet while certain elements of a sociology of psychiatry fit into an 'antipsychiatry' framework, it is not necessarily part of that broad alliance. Three related strands can be identified.
Labelling
In his second book, The rules ofsociological method", Durkheim outlined a celebrated account of criminal Paper read to Section of Psychiatry, 10 February 1987 0141·0768/881 030161-031$02.00/0 © 1988 The Royal Society of Medicine behaviour. Crime is always treated as socially pathological and yet exists in all societies: therefore surely it should be regarded as a normal phenomenon. What is more, the identification and punishment of criminals has an important effect on the rest ofsociety, purging it of guilt for the criminal act and defining the limits of social behaviour, thereby reinforcing a sense of solidarity and integrity to the social order.
In emphasizing the socially positive aspects of crime and the relativity of what was to acount as criminal behaviour, Durkheim laid the groundwork for future studies of deviance. His idea that society in a sense 'created' deviance by labelling certain behaviours as abnormal was developed and extended in the early 1950s by the so-called 'labelling theorists'. 'Primary' deviance was identified by means of a label. However, labelling itself had an effect on the person thus marked, and produced 'secondary' deviance, that is a significant behaviour change usually in conformity with the label. Put crudely, primary deviance could be established by randomly selecting anyone, claiming they had abnormal thoughts and labelling them as mentally ill. At the Durkheimian level this would have positive social effects: the claimed abnormal thoughts would reinforce the importance of normal ones for people, and the removal of such a person from society would provide reassurance and relief that such threats were being vitiated. But, in addition, the giving of such a label to anyone would itself induce changes in self-image and behaviour, resulting in the person so labelled actually becoming 'mentally ill'.
These different facets of the labelling process have contributed to different critiques of psychiatry. For example,Szasz-though not a sociologist -uses a formof primary deviance when he argues that mental illness does not 'really' exist but is a label given by one person to another", Scheff, on the other hand, has applied the full labelling model to argue that mental illness is the product of secondary deviance amongst those unfortunate enough to be processed by psychiatry".
This vision of mental illness as an artefact of casual diagnosis has, not unexpectedly, little support amongst psychiatrists, especially when most patients make their own choice to come with their suffering. But it would be premature to reject labelling out of hand just because it does not seem to accord with clinical experience. Indeed, whether psychiatrists like it or not, labelling theory has in various guises crept into psychiatric practice. Many psychiatrists would acknowledge that there are instances when people with marginal problems become patients through contact with psychiatric services, as Rosenhan tried to show'". A diagnostic label may exacerbate the underlying problem or engender a dysfunctional dependency on the psychiatric services. In its most florid form this can be seen in the detrimental effects oflabelling in large psychiatric hospitals. Goffman's books Stigma ll and Asylums 12 , which documented the internal psychological changes induced by a label and the subsequent reaction of others in the context of 'total institutions', can firmly claim to have had an important influence on the development of the idea of 'institutionalization'13 and hence on psychiatric policy in the last two decades.
Social control
Psychiatrists have baulked at the sociologists' suggestion that they are agents of social control, perhaps because of the element of coercion implied. Psychiatrists do have coercive powers, but use them only rarely; most of their work, they would claim, is therapeutic and not concerned with 'controlling' anyone.
What then does social control mean? First, the Durkheimian position on social control would be based on the concept of anomie, on the possibility of a failure in social regulation. If the goals and morality of the society do not pervade everyday life, then normlessness and consequent loss of direction and purpose will be the result. Various mechanisms and institutions therefore are required to regulate the core beliefs and values of the individual members of a society. Within this framework, medicine is an agency ofsocialcontrol because it is concernedwith identifying and regulating illness -an important form of social deviance.
Psychiatry fits very well into this model of social control. As part of medicine it identifies sickness and processes it such that it no longer poses a threat to social order, nor leaves the sufferers on the deviant margins of society. But in addition, because of its concern with mental functioning, it is even more directly concerned with the regulation of beliefs and values. From this perspective psychiatry can be seen as a beneficent social control agency of modern society.
However, the notion of social control also draws on a Marxist tradition which, as pointed out earlier, holds that it is too much society which is the problem, alienating man from his fellowman, work and 'species being'. In the context of alienation these elements of social control become more pernicious. Certainly psychiatry as an agency of social control helps stabilize and maintain the integrity of society -but whose society? If society is viewed from the outset as essentially flawed because of the way it alienates people from their essential roles, then mechanisms which help preserve the social order must be elements of coercion.
Following from Marx, perhaps the most common formulation of this model of social control is in social class analysis. The dominant social class or ruling elite maintain their hegemony through institutions, like psychiatry, which implicitly support the existing social order. Scull, for example, has argued that the emergence of the lunatic asylum in the 18th and 19th centuries was related to controlling itinerant labour and the workshy14, and the demise of the large asylum in the late 1960s was the product of an economic crisis brought about by the inability of capital to pay for such 'welfare' aervices'", Whilst most psychiatrists might not like this image of themselves as pawns in class warfare, they would probably acknowledge the strength of this argument in respect of past treatment of Soviet political dissidents by psychiatry. The issue, therefore, is not whether psychiatry exerts a power of social control; it certainly does, through both compulsory removal from society and the myriad minor techniquestranquillizers, listening, etc. -by which one person attempts to change another. The question would appear to be whether that control is benign or malignant.
Social constructionism
Durkheim's final major work, Elementary Forms of the Religious Life 16 , argued that the categories of human thought have their origins and patterning in social life. Extended to medicine, this position holds that there are no diseases existing in nature (either organic or psychiatric), they only exist as artefacts of human classifications. Thus Sedgewick has pointed out that a fungus on wheat is a disease because it harms the wheat; but if we wished to cultivate the fungus rather than the wheat the 'disease' would disappear 17 • In similar fashion, all human disease categories reflect some aspect of social expectation of how the body should perform and new diseases may therefore reflect new social conventions, such as the appearance of dyslexia, in literate societies or the disappearance of homosexuality in sexually tolerant ones.
If psychiatric diagnostic categories somehow correspond or relate to socially significant patterns, then for the sociologist the study of psychiatric labels will afford a valuable way of 'reading' society. Thus, for example, the shift from the major problem of insanity at the end of the 19th century to the generalized problems of the neuroses, might be explained by the fact that insanity was underpinned by the importance of rationality in the 19th century and the neuroses by our 20th century preoccupation with individual coping'". It might be difficult to see where this sort of work fits into the practice of everyday psychiatry; however, psychiatry does show a preoccupation with classification issues which at the moment tends to ignore conceptual exploration and rely on the empty promise of dust-bowl empiricism. Like the other facets of the sociology of psychiatry, its contribution may have to be judged retrospectively.
Conclusion
Whether sociologyis a basic science to psychiatry may be debated, especially when a biologically reductionist model of mental disease -in which social factors are to be lost in their biological effects -seems to be in Journal of the Royal Society of Medicine Volume 81 March 1988 163 the ascendancy, but it certainly has helped keep the social dimension of psychiatry alive. That may prove to have been its major contribution.
